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ANTITRUST
OVERVIEW
During the period of this survey, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed four antitrust cases, each
private actions under the Sherman Act.' None of the decisions
present major developments or changes in antitrust law. Two
cases, Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Board of
Realtors' and Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Association,' have
been selected for discussion to illustrate difficulties establishing
subject-matter jurisdiction over intrastate conduct and damages
for lost profits. A third case, Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors
Co.,' is of some interest as the latest in a recent series of attacks
on Coors' territorial marketing restrictions.' In this appeal, the
Tenth Circuit considered but rejected Coors' defenses that the
twenty-first amendment and Wyoming liquor laws preempted
application of the antitrust laws, and that the doctrine of in pari
delicto barred Lamp Liquors from pursuing its claim.'
The discussion following omits extended review of the Tenth
Circuit's fourth antitrust case during this period, T'ai Corp. v.
Kalso Systemet, Inc.7 In T'ai, the plaintiffs Sherman Act claims'
were predicated on elements of an alleged oral contract granting
plaintiff an exclusive franchise to sell "Earth Shoes"' in Colo-
rado. Judge McWilliams, for the Tenth Circuit, agreed with the
trial court that the evidence was insufficient to establish exist-
' 15 U.S.C. §H 1-7 (1976).
2 578 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1978).
3 568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1977).
4 563 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1977).
1 Predating Lamp in the series are Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561
F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1977) and Adolph Coors Co. v. F.T.C., 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
See Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 563 F.2d 425, 430-31 (10th Cir. 1977).
568 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1977).
T'ai Corp., a shoe retailer in Boulder, Colorado, asserted that Kalso, a vertically
integrated shoe manufacturer, had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act in two respects:
first, by imposition of a restriction on T'ai's solicitation of mailorder sales outside Colo-
rado; and second, by refusal to supply T'ai with sufficient stock for a new retail outlet in
Denver. Id. at 148.
* "Earth Shoes" are a patented shoe design characterized by a "negative heel," that
is, a heel approximately one and one-half inches lower than the ball of the foot. Id. at 146.
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ence of the contract. 0 As a result, T'ai's antitrust claims had no
foundation."
I. ANTITRUST JURISDICTION: Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v.
Denver Board of Realtors"
Establishing a link between an alleged trade restraint and
interstate commerce is a jurisdictional prerequisite for invoking
protection of the Sherman Act. 3 In most Sherman Act cases, the
interstate commerce connection has not been at issue." Where
the issue has arisen, two modes of analysis have been identified
for determining whether a course of conduct falls within the juris-
dictional reach of the Act.'5 The first, the "in commerce" test,
encompasses activities in the stream or flow of interstate com-
merce-for example, shipment of goods across state lines.'6 The
second, the "affecting commerce" test, encompasses conduct
having a substantial effect on interstate commerce." Through
Id. at 147.
" Id. at 148.
" 578 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Section one of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), prohibits "[e]very contract,
combination . ..or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States .... " Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), prohibits conspiracies and attempts to
monopolize "any part of the trade or commerce among the several States .... " See
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-34 (1947)
(tracing the historical evolution of the interstate commerce requirement of the Sherman
Act). One source of confusion is that the interstate commerce requirement has both
jurisdictional and substantive aspects. A motion to dismiss for failure to establish a
sufficient connection with interstate commerce may be based on either FED. R. Crv. P.
12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) or FlD. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted). The U.S. Supreme Court has recently stated that
the analysis in either case is identical. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hsp., 425
U.S. 738, 742 n.1 (1976).
" Note, Portrait of the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 323, 327 (1974).
's See id. at 327-28; Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation,
25 FED. B.J. 282, 286-87 (1965); L. SUituvAN, ANT'RrUST 709-10 (1977). See also Burke v.
Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967).
" Note, supra note 14, at 328. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186,
194-95 (1974). The "in commerce" test is the only test used for jurisdictional analysis of
alleged violations of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, because these statutes con-
tain express "in commerce" language. Id. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a. 14.18 (1976). The jurisdic-
tional reach of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts is thus more limited than that of
section one of the Sherman Act. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.. 419 U.S. at 195.
1 Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948). A classic explanation of the
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application of the "affecting commerce" test, local business ac-
tivities may become subject to Sherman Act regulation. 8
In Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Board of
Realtors,"5 the Tenth Circuit was presented with an opportunity
to evaluate the interstate impact of the real estate brokerage
business in Colorado. Income Realty, a Denver broker, comm-
enced an action against a local real estate trade association and
other Denver-area brokers for violations of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.20 Income Realty's complaint, however, was seri-
ously deficient. The allegations in the complaint regarding the
defendants' connection with interstate commerce were confined
to a statement that the parties were "engaged in interstate bro-
kerage of real estate."' 2' After reciting a number of Supreme Court
cases illustrating the "affecting commerce" test,n Judge Pickett,
for the majority, noted that Income Realty had alleged no facts
"affecting commerce" test appears in United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n,
336 U.S. 460 (1949) (Jackson, J.):
Restraints, to be effective, do not have to be applied all along the line of
movement of interstate commerce. The source of the restraint may be intra-
state, as the making of a contract or combination usually is; the application
of the restraint may be intrastate, as it often is; but neither matters if the
necessary effect is to stifle or restrain commerce among the states. If it is
interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze.
Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
," The U.S. Supreme Court applied section 1 to local hospital services in Hospital
Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976), and to a county bar association's
activities in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Court has empha-
sized that the "affecting commerce" test is qualitative, not quantitative. See United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1946). There isno requirement thathe
quantity of interstate commerce be reduced; in fact, anticompetitive activity may operate
to stimulate interstate trade. See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 322 n.2 (1967). As
long as a local trade restraint has some appreciable impact on interstate commerce, the
restraint is within the ambit of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
332 U.S. 218, 225 (1946); L. SuLLrVAN, supra note 15, at 710-11.
, 578 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1978).
The substance of Income Realty's complaint was that the Denver Board of Realtors
had engaged in a conspiracy to destroy Income Realty's business by a series of unfair trade
practices. Among other things, Income Realty alleged that defendants had published
defamatory statements concerning it, threatened to discontinue dealings with it, and
solicited filing of grievances concerning it with the Colorado Real Estate Commission. Id.
at 1327.
I Id. at 1328.
E.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976); United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), cited in Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc.
v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 1978).
1979
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indicating the brokers' conduct affected interstate commerce."
Relying on Bryan v. Stillwater Board of Realtors, 24 a recent Tenth
Circuit case similarly concerned with the interstate effects of
local real estate transactions, Judge Pickett affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of Income Realty's complaint without leave to
amend.2
Judge Logan filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Criticizing the majority's reliance on Bryan v.
Stillwater Board of Realtors,"e he quoted with approval language
from an Eighth Circuit decisionl indicating that real estate bro-
kerage services may have a sufficient connection with interstate
commerce, depending upon the evidence presented. Judge Logan
was of the opinion that "realtors and real estate board activities
in large metropolitan areas such as Denver, do sufficiently affect
interstate commerce that they cannot be classified as immune
from all antitrust claims."' '
0 578 F.2d at 1328.
" 578 F.2d at 1319 (10th Cir. 1977). Bryan was a private antitrust suit brought by a
real estate broker against his local real estate board after expulsion from board member-
ship. Unlike Income Realty, Bryan had made some attempt to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction. Specifically, Bryan alleged:
First, a substantial number of persons using the services of Board members
in conjunction with real estate transactions are persons moving into the City
of Stillwater from outside the State of Oklahoma, and persons moving from
the City of Stillwater to places outside the State of Oklahoma. Secondly..
Board members have caused substantial amounts of. .. financing, insur-
ance, commodities and services to move into the City of Stillwater from
outside the State of Oklahoma from business operating in interstate com-
merce . . . . Lastly, Board members have access to national referral and
marketing systems, whereby cooperating broker members split commission
fees in return for early information about a prospective seller or buyer.
Id. at 1322-23. Judge Barrett, for the Tenth Circuit, affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of Bryan's complaint on both substantive and jurisdictional grounds. With respect to the
jurisdictional deficiency, Judge Barrett stated: "[the conduct complained of is entirely
of a local character. ._. nothing contained in Bryan's complaint does other than indicate
that the acts complained of affect a business engaged in interstate commerce . . . the
complained of conduct does not affect the interstate commerce of such a business." Id. at
1326 (emphasis added). Cf. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738,
741 (1976) (plaintiff's complaint alleged that plaintiff's interstate commerce involvements
had been adversely affected).
0 Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1:26. 1329
(10th Cir. 1977).
0 578 F.2d at 1319 (10th Cir. 1977).
" Diversified Brokerage Services, Inc. v. Greater Des Moines Bd. of Realtors, 521 F.2d
1343, 1347 (8th Cir. 1975).




Judge Logan also focused on a distinction that has been
drawn between the burden of proof of interstate-commerce effect
in cases where a per se violation of the Sherman Act is alleged
and in cases requiring a rule-of-reason analysis.2 Resolution of
the jurisdictional issue of whether local activity substantially
affects interstate commerce may involve detailed consideration of
the nature of the local business and its interrelationship with
interstate markets.A0 This type of inquiry is quite appropriate
where the substantive aspects of plaintiff's claim must be evalu-
ated under the rule of reason. Where a plaintiff has alleged a per
se violation of the Sherman Act,3' however, it has been suggested
that the standard for pleading and proof of the interstate com-
merce nexus should be less rigorous.12 Judge Logan adopted this
viewpoint, expressing his opinion that Income Realty's complaint
would have been adequate jurisdictionally if the complaint had
presented a substantive claim of per se unlawful conduct.3 Since
the anticompetitive impact of defendants' conduct would have to
be measured by the rule of reason, however, Income Realty was
remiss in failing to make a prima facie showing of subject-matter
jurisdiction. 3' Judge Logan would have granted Income Realty
the opportunity to amend its complaint. 5
2 The difference between use of per se rules and the "rule of reason" in Sherman Act
analysis was succinctly restated by the U.S. Supreme Court this year in National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1355, 1363 (1978):
There are . . . two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish
their illegality-they are "illegal per se;" in the second category are agree-
ments whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it
was imposed.
See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
30 L. SULLVAN, supra note 15, at 712; P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIs 122 (1977).
,1 Examples of per se violations include price-fixing, group boycotts, and horizontal
territorial allocations.
n L. SULLVAN, supra note 15, at 712; P. AREEDA, supra note 29. See also United States
v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975). One of the rationales for use of per
se rules in Sherman Act analysis is to obviate the need for extensive consideration of
economic effects.
" Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1326, 1331
(10th Cir. 1978).
u Id.
u Id. For an example of a complaint successful in establishing Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion over the activities of local real estate brokers, see Gateway Assoc., Inc. v. Essex-
Costello, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 75,231 (N.D. II1. Aug. 28, 1974).
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II. DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS: Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers
Association3
An important component of antitrust enforcement policy is
preservation of the efficacy of private civil actions as a deterrent
to business conduct in violation of the antitrust laws. 37 One way
this goal has been served is by relaxation of the burden of proof
of the amount of damages for injury to plaintiffs business inter-
ests.3' The trier of fact is permitted to approximate the extent of
the injury by making "a just and reasonable estimate of the dam-
age based on relevant data," and to "act upon probable and
inferential, as well as direct and positive proof.
'3
In keeping with this relaxed standard of proof, the Supreme
Court has not attempted to impose any single formula for arriving
at a reasonable estimate of damages for lost profits." To date,
three methods for proving lost profits in private antitrust cases
have been sanctioned by federal courts. First, the "before and
after" theory compares plaintiff's earnings record before and
after defendant's violation." Second, the "yardstick" theory ex-
* 568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1977).
v Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 339 (1971). See also Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Semke v. Enid
Automobile Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1369 n.9 (10th Cir. 1972).
- L. SuLurvN, supra note 15, at 785. It is important to distinguish plaintiffs burden
with respect to the amount of damages from plaintiff's burden with respect to the fact of
damage. Proof of the fact of damage is required in order to establish standing to sue under
section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), which grants the right to bring a
private treble damage action to "[alny person . . . injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .... " See generally ABA SEcrON
or Aerrusur LAw, A-rmusT LAw D aLoPMmNrs 262-63 (1975); L. SULLIVAN, supra note
15, at 785. The two standards of proof were differentiated in Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931):
[Tihere is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to
establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and the mea-
sure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount. The rule which
precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the
certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attrib-
utable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount.
282 U.S. at 562.
" Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946), (citing Story Parch-
ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. 282 U.S. 555, 561-64 (1931)). See also Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 376-379 (1926).
" Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873, 879-80 (7th Cir. 1970). See Bigelow
v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 266 (1946).
"1 Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Cir. 1974). See, e.g., Bigelow v.
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 266 (1946). See generally Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson,
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amines the profit record of businesses that are closely comparable
to plaintiffs operation." Last, the newer "market share" theory
contrasts plaintiff's and defendant's market shares, and trans-
lates plaintiff's lost market share into a dollar volume of lost
sales, which is, in turn, multiplied by plaintiffs historical profit
record. 3 Whatever method is used, the essential task of a private
antitrust plaintiff is to advance a rational theory for measure-
ment of his injury and to introduce a sufficient amount of data
to support a reasonable estimate of the loss."
In Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Association," plaintiffs' fail-
ure to introduce a sufficient amount of evidence to support their
lost profits claim reduced their damage award by approximately
$65,000 on appeal to the Tenth Circuit.'" Defendants in Webb
were a group of bus tour brokers licensed by the ICC who had
formed a trade association, the Utah Tour Brokers Association.
Plaintiffs were unlicensed, independent operators who had con-
ducted several tours as agents for some of the defendants. Con-
tending that defendants had conspired to prevent plaintiffs' entry
into the tour brokerage business and to eliminate plaintiffs as
competitors, the plaintiffs instituted an action under sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.'7 There was ample evidence offered at
trial to support a finding that defendants had engaged in a con-
certed effort to boycott the plaintiffs," and the district court (Rit-
Comprehensive Models for Assessing Lost Profits to Antitrust Plaintiffs, 60 MINN. L. REv.
1233 (1976); Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damages for De-
struction of All or Part of a Business, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1566 (1967). The obvious difficulty
with this approach is that is precludes recovery by new businessmen. See text and accom-
panying note 58, infra.
1 Under the "yardstick" theory, the business used as a standard of comparison must
be as nearly identical to the plaintiff's as possible. Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d
659, 667 (5th Cir. 1974). The Tenth Circuit has employed the "yardstick" theory in
determining lost profits. See, e.g., Loew's, Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, Inc., 210 F.2d 86,
92 (10th Cir. 1954).
," Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, supra note 41, at 1239-43. See, e.g., Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling
Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
" L. SuLLivAN, supra note 15, at 786.
a 568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1977).
" See text accompanying notes 49 and 50, infra.
" In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had refused to deal with
them as agents unless they maintained a joint bank account with defendants, had refused
to allow plaintiffs' names to appear in advertising for tours conducted by the plaintiffs,
and had filed protests with the ICC to prevent plaintiffs from becoming licensed. 568 F.2d
at 672.
" On appeal, Judge Doyle, for the Tenth Circuit, agreed with the trial court that
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ter, C.J.) entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor. The trial court's
damage award included $10,165 actual damages" and $21,726 for
lost future profits. The total was trebled in accordance with sec-
tion four of the Clayton Act.50
On appeal, Judge Doyle, for the Tenth Circuit, vacated that
portion of the judgment representing plaintiffs' lost profits award,
on grounds that plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence
on which to base a lost profits claim.5' The evidence offered con-
sisted solely of plaintiffs' testimony that they had planned to
conduct eight additional tours the year of the boycott, but that
they had abandoned their plans after losing money on scheduled
tours they were forced to refer to Greyhound as a result of defen-
dants' boycott.52 Plaintiffs calculated that their profits on the
eight tours cancelled would be approximately 25% of the tour
price. Judge Doyle, however, focused on plaintiffs' admission that
they had little previous experience as tour operators. Acknow-
ledging the principle that reasonable estimates are permitted in
calculation of antitrust damage awards, Judge Doyle nevertheless
insisted that some "credible and substantial" foundation for a
lost-profits award be laid.53 He found critical plaintiffs' failure "to
show that from prior experience they would have made a profit
defendants' conduct constituted a group boycott. Defendants' activities were therefore per
se unlawful, under United States v. General Motors, Corp. 384 U.S. 127 (1966), Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). See Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass'n, 568 F.2d at 674-76. There
was documentary evidence that defendants had organized their trade association with
express intent to exclude plaintiffs from the tour brokerage business, to discourage other
brokers from using plaintiffs as their agents, and to encourage protest of the plaintiffs'
license application before the ICC. 568 F.2d at 672-73. Judge Doyle held that defendants'
activities in connection with the plaintiffs' ICC license application were protected by the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965);
Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Govt. Action: The Basis and Limits
of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 80 (1977). However, there was
enough evidence independent of the defendants' ICC involvements to support the finding
that defendants had made concerted efforts to prevent plaintiffs' entry into the tour
brokerage business. 568 F.2d at 674.
" As a result of defendants' refusal to allow plaintiffs to act as their agents, plaintiffs
were forced to refer previously scheduled tours to Greyhound. These alternative arrange-
ments were more costly. 568 F.2d at 676-77.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
" 568 F.2d at 678.
" Id. at 677.
" Id. at 678.
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. . . had the defendants allowed them to [act as defendants']
agents."'" Judge Doyle stressed the importance of expert testi-
mony in presentation and analysis of economic information, 5
with the implication that plaintiffs' failure to secure the assis-
tance of an economist at trial was a strategic error.
In view of Judge Doyle's emphasis on plaintiff's lack of an
established prior earnings record, Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers
Association could be read to support the proposition that the only
theory recognized in the Tenth Circuit for measurement of dam-
ages for lost profits is the "before and after" theory. 5 Judge Doyle
stated, "future profits cannot rest on possibilities. It must be
more tangible and prior experience is about the only foundation
on which this kind of evidence can rest."" The difficulty with this
emphasis is that it restricts lost-profits recovery to the class of
plaintiffs in business for a sufficient length of time to develop the
necessary quantum of prior experience, and precludes recovery by
new business entrants." There is additional-language in Judge
Doyle's opinion, however, indicating that the Webb case should
not be given such a limited reading and that the Tenth Circuit is
receptive to alternative theories for ascertaining lost future
profits. Judge Doyle was careful to emphasize that "courts are
" Id. at 677.
U Id. at 678.
" See text and accompanying note 41, supra.
" 568 F.2d at 677.
S On the other hand, proof of damages for lost future profits in cases involving new
businesses is always speculative to some degree. Under any theory of measurement, the
problem is to identify the point at which policies favoring antitrust recovery are su-
perseded by evidentiary standards demanding a credible basis for the award.
The treble damage suit would be inadequate to the policy requirements of
antitrust law if it did not give some relief to the new entrant whose attempt
to enter an industry is repelled by the defendant's illegal practices. But a
serious problem arises in defining an attempted entry substantial enough to
justify the conclusion that profits would have been made. Mere intention and
capability to go into a given line of business are not enough-the problems
of proof of intent and speculativeneas of the measure of damages are unsur-
mountable there. Thus, while potential entrants are a vital concern of anti-
trust policy, judicial practicalities deny the vindication of their interests in
treble damage suits. To succeed, a plaintiff that never emerged as a viable
business must prove an attempt to enter and the existence of a reasonable
chance of success if no illegal conduct had interfered; relevant factors are his
experience in the line of business, the undertaking of affirmative action to
engage in it, the ability to finance it, and the purchase of necessary facilities.
Note, note 41 supra, at 1576.
1979
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not strict about the kind of foundations or theories which are
employed so long as it is credible and substantial. . ."" More-
over, in reaching his conclusion that plaintiffs offered insufficient
evidence to justify their claim for lost profits, Judge Doyle relied
on cases where "yardstick" and "market share" approaches
were employed to arrive at lost profits estimates."0
III. PRESUMPTIVE EFFECT OF STATE LIQUOR REGULATION; In Pari
Delicto DOCTRINE: Lamp Liquors v. Adolph Coors Co."
Lamp Liquors v. Adolph Coors Co. is the third antitrust case
involving the Adolph Coors Co. to reach the Tenth Circuit in the
last four years." In all three actions, the root of the controversy
has been the legality of certain restrictions imposed by the brew-
ery on marketing and distribution of its beer. For years, Coors has
limited geographical distribution of its product to eleven western
states, and has required distributors and retailers to observe cer-
tain standards in handling and storage, in the interests of quality
control and product "integrity."
In 1966, the U. S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Arnold
Schwinn & Co.,' ruled that all vertical territorial and customer
restraints imposed by manufacturers after title, dominion and
risk of loss had passed to distributors were illegal per se under the
Sherman Act. In light of the Schwinn rule, Coors' restrictive mar-
keting scheme appeared to be headed for extinction. 5 In 1977,
however, in its landmark decision, Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc.," the Supreme Court overruled Schwinn, announc-
" Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass'n,-568 F.2d at 678.
0 E.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946) (yardstick); Rangen,
Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
936 (1966) (market share).
" 563 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1977), rev 'g and remanding 410 F. Supp. 536 (D. Wyo. 1976).
The others are Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807 (10th
Cir. 1977), and Adolph Coors Co. v. MTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
" Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807, 810-11 (10th Cir. 1977).
- 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967), overruled in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). For an excellent historical review of the law on vertical restraints up
to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in GTE Sylvania, see ABA ScrMON ON ANTrrRusT
LAw, VmcAL RESTRICIONs Laifrmso InTMrRAND COMPETTON (1977)
0 See Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (territorial assignments illegal per se under Schwinn rule). In the
FTC case, the Tenth Circuit noted that Coors had a legitimate interest in quality control,
and urged the Supreme Court to reconsider the Schwinn rule. 497 F.2d at 1187.
" 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In GTE Sylvania, the Court expressly acknowledged the Tenth
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ing that all vertical restraints would henceforth be judged under
the rule of reason." Coors' marketing policies have fared mark-
edly better in litigation since GTE Sylvania.68
Plaintiff in Lamp Liquors v. Adolph Coors Co." was a re-
tailer licensed under Wyoming liquor laws, who had com-
menced selling large quantities of Coors beer to wholesalers in
Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., outside the limits of Coors'
established geographical marketing area.7 0 When Coors' Wyo-
ming distributor, Cheyenne Beverage, Inc., learned of this pirati-
cal scheme, it reported Lamp to the Wyoming Liquor Commis-
sion and ceased supplying Lamp with Coors beer. Lamp promptly
sued Coors and Cheyenne Beverage under sections one, two, and
three of the Sherman Act," complaining that defendants' refusal
to deal was the product of an unlawful conspiracy. Lamps' com-
plaint focused on Coors' vertical customer and territorial restric-
tions. 2 Coors filed a motion to dismiss.
The district court decision on Coors' motion was rendered
before GTE Sylvania. The trial judge noted that, if the conspir-
acy were proven, application of the Schwinn rule would require a
judgment that Coors' vertical restraints were unlawful per se.73
The judge seemed to recognize, however, that the equities were
in Coors' favor. He noted that the Tenth Circuit had criticized
the rigidity of the Schwinn rule, and that Coors had persuasive
justifications for its marketing policies to assure quality of its
perishable product.7' The judge was therefore receptive to Coors'
arguments on motion: first, that enforcement of the Sherman Act
Circuit's suggestion that greater flexibility was needed in the law of vertical restraints.
Id. at 48 n.14.
" See note 29, supra. Under a rule-of-reason analysis, courts may consider factors
such as Coors' desires to assure speedy, refrigerated delivery of its product in assessing
the lawfulness of a vertical territorial restraint.
, See Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807, 813-14 (10th Cir.
1977) (remanding issue of Coors' territorial restraints for evidentiary hearing in light of
GTE Sylvania). See also Denver Post, June 9, 1978, at 29, Sec. C, col. 3. (On remand from
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Lamp Liquors, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in
Coors' favor The iury had been instructed that they could find Coors' restrictions on east
coast distribution reasonable and permissible under the antitrust laws.)
563 F.2d 425 (10th Cir 1977), rev'g and remanding 410 F. Supp. 536 (D. Wyo. 1976).
" 410 F. Supp. at 538.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976).
n See Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 410 F. Supp. at 538.




would conflict with Wyoming state liquor laws enacted under the
twenty-first amendment;" and, second, that plaintiff lacked
standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act7" since his business
activities violated Wyoming law." Accordingly, the district court
granted Coors' motion to dismiss.78 Lamp appealed to the Tenth
Circuit.
In the interim, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Continental
T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.7" As a result, the merits of
Lamp's case-the legality of Coors' vertical territorial restric-
tions-could be evaluated at trial under the rule of reason, with
appropriate weight given to Coors' business justifications."0 The
Tenth Circuit was therefore not constrained to adopt the trial
court's rulings on preemption and standing in order to circum-
vent the Schwinn rule. Instead, the Tenth Circuit was free to
examine the analytical correctness of the trial court's view with-
out regard to the underlying equities of Coors' position on the
merits.
Judge Doyle, for the majority, first examined the twenty-first
amendment, finding that its main purpose was to empower dry
states to prohibit importation of liquor for use within their bor-
ders." Relying on United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 82 Judge
Doyle focused on the distinction between importation and expor-
tation drawn in the Frankfort case." Contrary to the view of the
" U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. This section provides: The transportation of impor-
tation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
" 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See note 38, supra.
" See Wvo. STAT. §§ 12-1-101, 12-1-102, 12-1-121 (1977). Since Lamp held a retail
license only, it was prohibited from making sales to wholesalers. Lamp Liquors, Inc. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 410 F. Supp. at 540.
"410 F. Supp. at 541.
- 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
0 See Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 563 F. 2d 425, 431-32 (10th Cir. 1977).
I Id. at 429.
- 324 U.S. 293 (1945). Frankfort is one of only two U.S. Supreme Court cases to have
considered the interrelationship between the states' regulatory authority under the
twenty-first amendment and the antitrust laws. Frankfort held that the twenty-first
amendment did not give "the states plenary and exclusive power to regulate the conduct
of persons doing an interstate liquor business outside their boundaries." Id. at 299. See
also Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45-46 (1966) (twenty-first
amendment does not prevent enforcement of antitrust laws against conspiracy to fix liquor
prices).
0 Chief Judge Markey, dissenting in Lamp Liquors, disagreed with Judge Doyle on
this point. He would have affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the basis of twenty-first
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trial court, he found that the states' regulatory authority over
liquor importation under the twenty-first amendment did not
preempt federal authority to regulate out-of-state commerce in
liquor under the Sherman Act. Judge Doyle also examined the
Wyoming licensing statutes enacted pursuant to the twenty-first
amendment, concluding that the state had not undertaken to
regulate liquor traffic in a way that would conflict with applica-
tion of the antitrust laws. 4
Judge Doyle went on to comment that, even if a conflict had
been found, Coors did not have standing to assert the state's
immunity as a defense. He noted that there were no signs that
"Wyoming has expressed an intention to allow Coors . . . to as-
sume its official function."" Judge Doyle's opinion did not depart
into an extended consideration of the "state action" exemption
to the antitrust laws,8" but his view is fully consistent with two
recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the proper scope of
this exemption, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.87 and Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar. 88 Together, Cantor and Goldfarb require that,
in order for a private party to assert state sovereign immunity as
a defense to anticompetitive conduct, that conduct must have
been required or directed by the state acting in its sovereign
capacity. If a state directive is found, antitrust immunity will be
implied only to the minimum extent necessary for operation of
the state's regulatory scheme.8"
In the second part of his opinion, Judge Doyle considered the
trial court's ruling that Lamp did not have standing to maintain
its claim. The trial court had reasoned that, since Lamp's resale
business was in violation of Wyoming liquor licensing statutes,
Lamp did not have a business interest protectible by the antitrust
amendment supremacy, in light of the fact that Lamp's customers, rather than Lamp
itself, were exporting. 563 F.2d at 432-33.
" Id. at 430.
u Id.
" The "state action" exemption, granting antitrust immunity for anticompetitive
restraints sanctioned by a state acting in its sovereign capacity, stems from the U. S.
Supreme Court decision in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). For a review of the
historical development of the state action doctrine, see City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
- 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
- 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
" Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. at 596-97; Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. at 790-91.
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laws." Judge Doyle characterized the trial court's rule as an ap-
plication of the doctrine of in pari delicto."
The doctrine of in pari delicto, which translates, "of equal
fault," is a common law defense applicable where a plaintiff seek-
ing legal or equitable relief is also involved in the wrongdoing that
forms the basis of his claim.2 In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp.,' 3 recognizing that private antitrust
suits serve the important public purpose of deterring potential
antitrust violations, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the doc-
trine of in pari delicto would not be recognized as a defense to
antitrust cases." Relying on Perma Life, as well as two subse-
quent Tenth Circuit decisions,' 5 Judge Doyle noted that the doc-
trine had been rejected as an antitrust defense in the Tenth Cir-
cuit. He also observed that Lamp's alleged violation of the Wyo-
ming state liquor laws was not at all related to Coors' territorial
restrictions that constituted the basis of Lamp's suit, and reiter-
ated the common law requirement for application of the defense
that plaintiff must have participated in the wrong of which defen-
dant complained. 8 Judge Doyle reversed and remanded the case
with instructions that the trial court consider the effect of GTE
Sylvania at trial on the merits."
Suzanne L. Weakley
Lamp Liquors v. Adolph Coors Co., 410 F. Supp. at 541.
'4 563 F.2d at 431.
" Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968).
"Id.
' Id. For two recent comments on the proper role of the in pari delicto doctrine in
antitrust litigation, see Hover, The Viability of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Private
Antitrust Actions, 31 RuTmms L. REv. 126 (1977), and Katz, A Reexamination of In Pari
Delicto under the Antitrust Laws, 19 B.C. L. Rzv. 207 (1977).
' Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, 561 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1977); Semke v.
Enid Automobile Dealers Assoc., 456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972).
' Lamp Liquors v. Adolph Coors Co., 563 F.2d at 431.
I d. at 432. Coors' marketing policies were vindicated on remand. See note 68, supra.
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